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The dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge has been shown in a number 
of previous studies utilizing the process control task, where participants would learn to control 
the system well, but not be able to verbally articulate their knowledge (Berry & Broadbent, 
1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 
1989; Roussel, 1999; Sun & Mathews, 2005). This study attempts to advance this basic re-
search in the area of implicit learning by examining the type of mental knowledge representa-
tion acquired in implicitly learned tasks, and also assess the transfer of that knowledge to con-
ceptually similar tasks. Participants controlled a simulated nuclear reactor version of the process 
control task by inputting a selected number of fuel pellets to maintain a desired temperature on 
several tests over 2 one-hour sessions after receiving either instructions to perform the task 
through visual means, memorizing exemplars, receiving hints about how the task operates, or 
receiving no instruction. Results show that participants’ performance improves with experien-
tial practice, even after memorizing the best responses on standard tests.  Results from transfer 
tests (i.e., a novel target level and a different scale than previously practiced) suggest that ex-
plicit knowledge is less transferable than the implicit knowledge acquired through practice in 
this task. This study did not support that the process control task is normally learned through 
visual recognition of patterns of inputs and outputs across trials- however, the results neither 
support that the task is normally learned by the storage of exemplars in the form of a look-up 





Any degree of expertise would depend on both explicit, conceptual knowledge and 
implicit, experiential knowledge. However, experts are often only conscious of their explicit 
knowledge. This dissociation has been shown in a number of previous studies utilizing the 
process control task, where participants would learn to control the system well, but not be able 
to verbally articulate their knowledge (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; 
Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989; Roussel, 1999; Sun & 
Mathews, 2005). This lack of awareness of experiential knowledge engenders stringent 
challenges for learning and training programs in many different contexts since experts are often 
at a loss when trying to convey their knowledge to others. This study will attempt to advance 
basic research in the areas of learning and cognition by examining the type of mental 
knowledge representation that is acquired in implicitly learned tasks, and also assess the 
transfer of that knowledge to conceptually similar tasks.  
Learning research is a major part of the foundation of cognitive psychology.  Although a 
large number of definitions exist for the phenomenon of explicit learning, a common 
undercurrent pervades most of them: explicit learning is knowledge that is mastered with 
awareness and effort, is accurate, is able to be articulated easily, shows a large amount of 
generalization between disparate tasks, is usually slow and uses substantial amounts of the 
learner’s cognitive resources, and finally, is consciously available to the learner (Berry & 
Dienes, 1993).  Although meetings among cognitive psychologists remain placid and amicable 
when the term “explicit learning” is brought forth, the term “implicit learning” has not been 
greeted with the same atmosphere of comity and consensus that its more provocative relative, 
explicit learning, has been greeted with by the scientific community. 
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One of the most widely debated theories in the field of cognitive psychology is that of 
implicit learning. Although implicit learning has been defined in innumerable ways throughout 
the cognitive psychology literature, this is one of the most widely accepted definitions of the 
term:   
“Implicit learning is the process through which we become sensitive to certain 
 regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to learn about those 
 commonalities, (2) in the absence of awareness that one is learning, and (3) in such a 
 way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express”  (Cleeremans, 1997). 
 
 It is noteworthy that even amongst ardent supporters of the phenomenon of implicitly 
acquired knowledge, the degree of relation between explicit learning and implicit learning is 
debated. For example, Lewicki (1986) proposed that although implicit learning and explicit 
learning are both real world concepts that can be shown to exist experimentally, explicit 
knowledge operates completely independently from implicit knowledge.  A second theory of 
implicit learning posits that implicit learning is secondary to the primary experience and occurs 
independent of any intention to assimilate new material or experiences.  Even more interesting 
is the fact that this hypothesis puts forth the notion that implicit learning occurs outside of the 
subject’s awareness (Cleeremans, 1997). A third hypothesis presented by Mathews, Buss, 
Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, and Druhan (1989) argues that implicit and explicit learning 
are not independent, but are rather symbiotic: implicit processes occur by recognition of 
patterns and the explicit knowledge that this pattern recognition activates in turn affects the 
output of the implicit learning mechanisms. This hypothesis is based on the view that implicit 
learning is a memory-based mechanism that automatically identifies patterns of family 
resemblance among similar experiences (Mathews, et al., 1989).  This research study will focus 
on testing the hypothesis of pattern recognition as a possible mechanism of implicit learning 
using a dynamic process control task as discussed further within. 
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Characteristics of Implicit Knowledge 
Although the availability of knowledge is disputed, previous research has shown that 
much of what is acquired through implicit learning tasks eventually becomes available to 
conscious expression through accumulated practice (Reber, 1989; Mathews, et al., 1989; 
Sanderson, 1989). However, what is stored usually exceeds what can be expressed, as indicated 
by the progressive performance on implicit learning tasks and participants’ inability to verbalize 
rules about how the task behaves without extensive practice (Broadbent, FitzGerald, & 
Broadbent, 1986; Mathews, et al., 1989; Sanderson, 1989).  
One alleged characteristic of implicit learning is that it shows transfer specificity (Berry 
& Dienes, 1993). The knowledge acquired in implicit learning tasks is believed to be less 
flexible and more context bound than knowledge that is acquired explicitly. One feature of 
implicit learning that displays the notion of transfer specificity is the relative inaccessibility of 
knowledge in free recall. Previous studies of implicit learning have shown very low rates of 
transfer to explicit recall tests and verbalization of the acquired knowledge (Berry & Broadbent, 
1984; Mathews, et al., 1989). Participants in these experiments could not articulate what they 
know or answer questions about the tasks. However, although they believed they were merely 
guessing, participants’ performance was still above chance. Such evidence suggests that 
implicit learning cultivates relatively specific knowledge that cannot be freely recalled.  
There is also evidence that implicitly acquired knowledge shows limited transfer to 
related tasks (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Berry & Dienes, 1993; Roussel, 1999). Previous 
research using implicit learning tasks have shown little or greatly reduced transfer to similar 
tasks based on the same underlying structure. Even when participants were informed of the 
critical relationship between two structurally related tasks, Berry and Broadbent (1988) found 
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that transfer between the tasks was impeded. They suggested that informing the participants of 
the relationship between the two tasks before carrying out the second task induced an explicit 
mode of learning that had a negative effect on the subsequent performance. A later study by 
Berry (1991) showed a lack of transfer between merely watching participants perform a task 
and their actual performance when controlling the task themselves. This suggests that for 
implicit learning to occur, one must learn by actually doing the task, and not simply through 
observation.  
Process Control Task 
 The process control task is a widely used computerized implicit learning task that can 
incorporate many different cover stories, although the underlying rules governing its behavior 
remains the same. Originally utilized by Berry and Broadbent (1984), the process control task 
used in these experiments had participants imagine that they were controlling a factory that 
produces sugar. The participants’ goal was to maintain a given target level of sugar production 
by varying the number of workers employed at the factory.  The range of sugar production and 
the participants’ input of workers were over a total of twelve levels (e.g., 1000 through 12000 
tons of sugar for production output, and 100-1200 workers employed for participants’ inputs). 
Production of sugar in this task is affected by the number of workers in a nonlinear fashion 
because of the inclusion of the previous output level of sugar production in the following 
formula: P = (2 x W) – P1 + N, where P = the current level of sugar production, W = the 
number of workers input by the participant, P1 = the previous level of sugar production, and N 
= a random noise element that varies the output by +/- 1000, or one level, at a 33% chance of 
variation in either direction.   
 All versions of the process control task have many qualities which makes it a good 
analogue for complex tasks that are learned in the real world. For instance, participants often 
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find the task difficult to learn, and, while participants’ performance improves, their ability to 
communicate knowledge about how the task operates occurs rarely and only after extensive 
practice (Roussel, 1999).  This is similar to expertise for many real-world tasks, such as driving 
a car, playing golf, or riding a bicycle, which all involve mastering complex sets of motor skills, 
yet people are often at a loss for words when it comes to explaining exactly how they perform 
these actions.  
The process control task also imitates real-world complex tasks in that it is dynamic, 
where the initial existing state of the system is constantly changing. This would be similar to the 
constantly changing positions of the players and the ball when playing a game of tennis. In the 
process control task, the output is not only dependent on the participant’s input, but also on the 
previous output. This, plus the addition of the random noise element makes learning the 
underlying rules of the process control task difficult to discover. Previous research using the 
process control task has shown that participants rarely discover or state the formula, and are 
more likely to fall back on an implicit mode to guide their performance (Mathews, et al., 1989; 
Roussel, 1999). This is because of the nonlinear relationship between the participants’ input and 
the system’s next output in the process control task (e.g., increasing the number of employees 
does not always increase sugar production levels, similarly, using fewer workers does not 
always decrease sugar production levels). 
A cover story that Berry and Broadbent (1984) utilized for the process control task in 
addition to the sugar factory description involved informing participants that they would be 
interacting with a computer person named Clegg. Clegg’s behavior and the participants’ inputs 
ranged over twelve levels from very rude to loving, corresponding to the number of employees 
and sugar production in the other version of the task mentioned previously.  The computer 
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person interaction task was mathematically equivalent because it utilized the same formula to 
control the output levels. Participants were instructed to maintain Clegg’s behavior at the very 
friendly level, similar to maintaining a target level of production of sugar (i.e., 6000 tons). This 
second cover story was used to test for consistent results between the two versions of the task, 
with no differences being found in performance between the two distinct cover stories (Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984).  
 A later study by Sun and Mathews (2005) employed the sugar factory cover story and 
another cover story for the process control task, where participants imagined that they were 
controlling a simulated nuclear reactor’s temperature by inputting varying amounts of fuel 
pellets. Although similar to the sugar factory version of the process control task in all aspects 
except the input and output labels and the cover story, the nuclear reactor version was thought 
to be a less “rich” domain for generating overly general rules (Sun & Mathews, 2005).   In other 
words, participants would be more easily able to think of reasons to explain the inconsistent 
effect of increasing workers, which can sometimes cause sugar production to increase or 
sometimes decrease. For example, a decrement in sugar production following an increase in the 
workforce could be contingent on factors such as: worker fatigue, overcrowding or low worker 
morale, whereas increased sugar production following a decrease in the number of employees 
could be the result of supplanting a less productive work force with a more efficient one or 
increasing worker morale. Due to the nuclear reactor task’s more mechanical, abstract nature, 
and the lack of obvious relationships between variables (e.g., an increase in the quantity of fuel 
pellets input into the system can sometimes decrease the nuclear reactor’s temperature), most 
participants would likely encounter a large amount of difficulty arriving at explanations that 
make sense to them for counterintuitive events. However, the results of this study showed 
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identical patterns of results with both types of cover story (Sun & Mathews, 2005). Thus, 
richness of knowledge about a domain does not appear to be an important factor for this task.  
One of the properties investigated in previous research using the process control task 
was how different types of verbal instruction affected participants’ performance on the task.  
Berry and Broadbent (1984) utilized the process control task to examine whether verbal 
instruction on how to reach the target level would affect task performance and verbalizable 
knowledge. They found that the verbal instructions improved the participants’ performance on 
the task (i.e., the ability to control sugar production), except when it was coupled with a 
requirement to verbally validate each response.  Other types of instruction such as exemplar 
memorization, providing a simple heuristic, rule instruction, and providing written transcripts of 
participants “thinking aloud” as they performed the task, were also found to be of some benefit 
to performance on the process control task (Stanley, et al., 1989).  
Another issue, concerning the flexibility of implicitly acquired knowledge, was also 
tested in prior studies using the process control task. Some researchers who have investigated 
the transfer of implicit knowledge have suggested that it is inflexible and highly specific (Berry 
& Dienes, 1993; Dienes & Fahey, 1995). For example, Dienes and Fahey (1995) found that 
performance on the process control task was at chance levels when the initial state of the system 
was one that had not been experienced before (e.g., the current output level had not been seen 
before). Other studies utilizing versions of the process control task have found positive transfer 
between performance on two perceptually similar tasks, although no transfer was found across 
two perceptually dissimilar tasks, even though the underlying equation governing the tasks was 
the same (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Squire & Frambach, 1990).  In the case of Berry and 
Broadbent (1988), participants also showed no transfer between two conceptually similar tasks 
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if they were first informed of the relationship between them. It seems that informing participants 
of the central relationship between the two tasks prevented them from transferring the pertinent 
information from one task to the other. This discovery suggests that the process control task may 
be performed in a more implicit way, in which participants are not consciously aware of the basis 
on which they are responding (Berry & Broadbent, 1988).  
A subsequent study that also investigated the transfer of implicit knowledge using the 
process control task was carried out by Dienes and Fahey (1998), who tested performance for 
sugar production levels that were either experienced or not experienced previously. What they 
found was that performance on this ‘specific situations’ task was improved for not only the exact 
production levels experienced before, but also numerically adjacent output levels (i.e., outputs that 
were one level in either direction from the ones experienced previously). However, performance 
on this test for situations beyond one level of sugar production different from those formerly 
experienced (i.e., nonadjacent) were at chance levels or below, which suggests that transfer of the 
knowledge acquired in this task is limited (Dienes and Fahey, 1998).  
In another study, Roussel, (1999) had participants attempt to achieve a new target 
production level on half of the trials during a final testing phase in an experiment utilizing the 
process control task. This assessed the flexibility of implicit knowledge by measuring performance 
for old and new target levels separately. As anticipated, performance for old target levels was 
significantly greater than for new target levels (Roussel, 1999). Nevertheless, performance for the 
new target levels was better than chance, suggesting some transfer of implicit knowledge.  
Finding copious transfer effects in previous experiments utilizing the process control 
paradigm are particularly rare. However, Sun and Mathews (2005) argued that the restricted 
transfer of implicit knowledge found in these experiments was due to the limited exposure to 
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training and performing of the task. Real-world learning situations that depend heavily on 
implicit knowledge, such as natural language processing, would require extensive practice, 
whereas the typical experiments investigating the transfer of implicit knowledge usually 
involved performing a task for less than 5 minutes. This quantity of practice may not be 
adequate to extend the level of implicit knowledge to that which is necessary to enable the 
accurate demonstration of its flexibility (Sun & Mathews, 2005). The alleged inflexible nature 
of implicit knowledge has previously been disputed by Mathews, et al. (1989) also, who 
suggested that this attribute is due to the way implicit learning has been studied formerly.  Prior 
studies have searched for “pure” cases of implicit learning, utilizing simple motor tasks (i.e., 
reaction times) where there is no evidence of conscious awareness of what was learned. These 
simple motor tasks simply do not lend themselves to the study of generalization and flexibility 
of acquired knowledge. In addition, it has been posited that the flexibility of implicit knowledge 
is “tuned” to the level of variability of the learning task, with more advanced implicit learning 
tasks showing greater transfer (Mathews, et al., 1989). 
The effects of different types of reflection on performance in the process control task 
were also examined in previous research.  The effect of one form of reflection, involving 
merely instructing participants to attempt to figure out the rules affecting the behavior of the 
task, has been varied. This manipulation was found to decrease the participants’ learning and 
performance on the process control task when in a non-salient condition where the relationship 
of the input to the output was not easy to predict (e.g., the normal nature of the process control 
task). However, the same type of reflection did improve participants’ learning and performance 
when in a salient condition where the relationship of the input to the output was easy to 
discover (e.g., the output was always two levels lower than the immediately preceding input), 
(Berry & Broadbent, 1988).    
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Another type of reflection utilized in conjunction with the process control task was used 
by Berry and Broadbent (1984), which required participants to think out loud and to verbally 
report their reasoning for input choices as they performed the task. What Berry and Broadbent 
found was that this concurrent reflection was not effective in improving learning or 
performance on the process control task. These experiments, however, did not incorporate a 
proper non-verbalizing control group.  A subsequent investigation using two versions of the 
process control task done by Stanley and colleagues (1989), found that verbalization caused a 
slight positive increase in the level of learning, as measured by participants’ performance on the 
tasks.  
Roussel, (1999), however, found that reflective practice, which involved having 
participants write out and log which rules they were using for each input, interferes with 
learning to control sugar production in the process control task. Two possible mechanisms were 
proposed by Roussel, (1999) for this interference effect of reflection on performance. The first 
was participants’ generation of inaccurate explicit rules about how the task behaves due to 
attempted reflection about the task. Roussel (1999) hypothesized that participants would 
continue to use the inaccurate rules they generated until they discovered new ones, thus 
affecting performance in a negative way. The second possible mechanism posited was that the 
negative effect on performance was due to interference with implicit learning processes because 
the concurrent reflection acts as a secondary task, using up cognitive resources.  
Sun and Mathews (2005) tested Roussel’s two proposed mechanisms for the 
interference effect by comparing the nuclear reactor version and the sugar production version of 
the process control task. Sun and Mathews (2005) hypothesized that if the main reason for the 
negative effect of reflection is due to participants generating inaccurate rules, that the 
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interference effect would be stronger in the sugar factory version because of its richer nature for 
generating overly general or inaccurate rules as discussed previously, and because the reactor 
control scenario is a relatively foreign system that seems mechanical to participants. Sun and 
Mathews (2005) therefore hypothesized that if Roussel’s second proposed mechanism, 
interference with the implicit learning process, is the more important factor for the interference 
effect, that similar levels of reflective interference would be found in both versions of the task. 
Although the negative effect of explicit reflective practice was replicated from Roussel’s (1999) 
study, the prediction that there would be a larger interference effect occurring in the more 
familiar sugar factory version of the task was not supported (Sun and Mathews, 2005). This 
suggests that interference with implicit learning processes rather than generating inaccurate 
rules seems to be the major cause of the interference effect of reflection.  
Another manipulation that was done using the process control task was to expose 
participants to others’ ideas about the task, using other participants’ policies (i.e., written 
instructions on how to perform the task), experimenter-provided task hints, and allowing 
participants the opportunity to discuss their ideas with other learners in the experiment 
(Roussel, 1999). Roussel, (1999), found that exposing participants to others’ policies had no 
effect, suggesting that learners may ignore ideas not generated by themselves, or that they may 
have trouble integrating others’ ideas into their own beliefs about the task.   
Providing participants with task hints in the form of a few good examples, such as “If 
current reactor temperature is 10,000, then input 800 fuel pellets”, was found to have facilitative 
effects on learning in the process control task (Roussel, 1999; Sun and Mathews, 2005). 
Participants who received the hints outperformed those who did not in two separate 
experiments, done by Roussel, (1999), and Sun and Mathews (2005), respectively. Both found 
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that these simple hints had an immense effect on participants’ learning and performance. 
Roussel, (1999) suggested that the hints’ effectiveness was more than just a function of 
providing specific valid instances for only a few possible circumstances, but rather that it 
helped participants by providing a general idea of how to look at the task. Sun and Mathews 
(2005) suggest that the hints do not cause participants to perform effective hypothesis testing to 
find the formula or search for more good rules because concurrent reflection while attempting 
the task, even when given the hints, never enhanced learning. Instead, they proposed that the 
hints allowed participants to more quickly perceive the family resemblance among cases by 
noticing the pattern of successful and unsuccessful trials and more rapidly find good cases 
(Roussel, 1999; Sun and Mathews, 2005). Nonetheless, reflection done in between practice 
sessions did enhance performance, and even more so when the participants’ reflection was 
focused on recalling specific valid instances of controlling the reactor’s temperature (Sun and 
Mathews, 2005).   
Other evidence that learners seem to acquire correct responses more from implicit 
induction rather than explicit rule generation in the process control task was found by Sun and 
Mathews (2005). In one condition in this experiment, participants were given hints about the 
form of the equation and given calculators to tests their hypotheses. Despite this, the college 
level participants were still exceptionally bad at figuring out the relatively simple equation that 
controlled the simulated nuclear reactor’s temperature (Sun and Mathews, 2005). This finding 
is in alignment with the hypothesis proposed here, that participants are not discovering and 
recalling rules, but rather learn the process control task through pattern recognition by 
responding to visual cues and implicitly knowing what to do.  
Knowledge Representation 
There has been considerable debate over the type of mental representation of knowledge 
acquired in implicit learning tasks. One of the key distinctions between the different theoretical 
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frameworks for understanding implicit learning is whether the knowledge acquired is 
represented in the form of the storage and retrieval of exemplars (e.g., in a “look-up table” 
format) (Broadbent, et al., 1986; Marescaux, Luc, & Karnas, 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995), or 
in a more abstract way (Reber, 1989; Sun & Mathews, 2005). One model suggests that only 
instances where participants reach their goal are recorded in a list, or “look-up table”, and does 
not distinguish the knowledge representation as being either implicit or explicit. Berry and 
Broadbent (1988) postulated two different possible modes of learning involved in complex 
situations where participants acquired knowledge about the relationships between variables. 
One mode is unselective, or implicit, where learners observe all the variables without selection 
and attempt to store all of the contingencies between them. This case-based knowledge could be 
represented as a look-up table containing not only valid exemplars, but bad instances as well. 
An alternative mode of learning that was suggested was a selective or explicit mode in which 
only the contingencies between a few key variables are stored. This is likely to result in 
knowledge that can become explicit because of the relatively small number of relationships 
involved (Berry & Broadbent, 1988). This method of learning can be fast and efficient 
providing that the correct variables are selected. However, when a task contains many variables 
and the wrong ones are selected, learning would be poor in this mode as compared to the 
implicit one. Models suggesting a look-up table where the information is implicit, state that the 
stored information combines and gives the learner a sense of familiarity or a judgment about its 
classification without necessarily permitting participants to report which exemplars were used 
or to use individual exemplars for different tasks (Dienes & Berry, 1993).   
 Perruchet (1998) has also argued for the fragmentary knowledge of specific events 
accounting for the performance on implicit learning tasks, although he posits that the 
 
14 
knowledge acquired is explicit. This hypothesis puts forth that no active abstraction processes 
occurs in implicit learning, but that there is only partial explicit memories of the stimuli 
presented. Perruchet (1998) believes that participants in any implicit learning situation will 
parse the material into small individual units that do not overlap, and that the size of these units 
are determined by one’s capacity limitations. According to this hypothesis, one cannot gain 
genuine knowledge of the abstract rules governing a situation through implicit learning 
mechanisms alone, regardless of the amount of training (Perruchet, 1998). In other words, the 
underlying rules can only be discovered by means of explicit conscious effort. 
  Knowledge that is acquired in the explicit mode can be considered model-based, 
consisting of internalized mental models and other declarative knowledge such as general rules, 
rather than memories of past experiences involving the task (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; 
Mathews, et al., 1989; Reber, 1989). This explicit knowledge usually would not contain specific 
responses to prior experiences (e.g., a look-up table). Instead, some sort of inferential process 
would have to be used to decide on a course of action (e.g., applying a general rule). Previous 
research however, has shown that there is often a large discrepancy between learners’ mental 
models and the way they actually perform a task  (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Mathews, et al., 
1989). The actual performance of a task was shown to usually depend more on case-based 
knowledge, while participants would typically ignore model-based knowledge, although they 
would describe their performance to others using mental models. Thus, what learners do and 
say are not always the same.  
 An underlying assumption about the development of expertise that is consistent with 
prior empirical research findings is that conscious and effortful attempts to integrate the two 
types of knowledge are necessary for speeding up the learning of complex tasks (Berry & 
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Broadbent, 1984; Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Berry & Dienes, 1993; Mathews, et al., 1989). 
Getting learners to integrate new model-based knowledge, however, is not easy, as previous 
research has demonstrated that once participants have some level of skill, there is a strong 
tendency to rely entirely on case-based knowledge to perform a task. Another view of expertise 
hypothesizes that deliberate practice is necessary and critical for its development (Ericsson, 
Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). When learners engage in effortful and deliberate practice of a 
task, they attempt to integrate new mental models with their active mental models and their 
actual performance of the task, thus putting new or changed models into action and integrating 
them with their case-based knowledge.  
Knowledge Representation in the Process Control Task  
 In the process control task, the system is regulated by a single abstract rule (i.e., the 
formula determining the output), however, the structure embedded within this task can be 
described as a set of simple associations between the current state of the system and the input 
necessary in order to reach the target level (e.g., “If current reactor temperature is 10,000, then 
input 800 fuel pellets; If current reactor temperature is 11,000, then input 700 fuel pellets, 
etc.”). This set of pair-wise associations for specific instances has been described as a look-up 
table (Dienes & Fahey, 1995). Using a look-up table to perform the process control task 
consists of recalling and executing the same action in response to a new situation that was 
previously successful in earlier trials. In some previous studies utilizing the process control 
task, it has been shown that participants abstract no rules, but rather perform the task as 
described by the look-up table model (Marescaux, et al., 1989; Dienes & Fahey, 1995). The one 
exception to this that has been found was when the relationship between input and output was 
determined by a very simple and salient rule (e.g., the output was always two levels lower than 
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the input, with the current state of the system having no effect) (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; 
Dienes & Fahey, 1995). In this salient condition only, participants were able to acquire and use 
abstract knowledge in the form of general rules about how the system operates.  
 Although it has been hypothesized that the recall of specific instances in case-based 
knowledge is in the form of a look-up table, this recollection of previous experiences does not 
have to be explicit. When presented with a particular situation in the process control task (e.g., 
the current output), participants may recognize a similar past experience, either consciously or 
unconsciously, in which they made a certain response and were successful in reaching their 
target level and simply respond in the same manner again (Stanley, et al., 1989). If participants 
are not consciously recalling the previous episodes and their recognition is implicit, they may 
only experience a feeling of knowing what to do, and, while they would be able to perform the 
task, they would not be able to articulate this knowledge.  This is consistent with prior findings 
in the implicit learning literature which utilized the process control task to show the dissociation 
between performance ability and verbalizable knowledge (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Berry & 
Broadbent, 1988; Mathews et al., 1989; Stanley et al., 1989).  
In the look-up table hypothesis posited by Dienes and Fahey (1995), the details of the 
individual instances in the table can be amalgamated, and therefore the knowledge would 
become more abstract, but not necessarily as abstract as the general rules learned in the explicit, 
model-based mode (e.g., “respond halfway between current output and the target level”).  The 
amount of processing done on the stimuli was hypothesized to determine how abstract the 
stored knowledge becomes. With the least possible processing, each specific instance would be 
stored independently of the others.  This simple list of instances could be considered the 
“purest” look-up table (Dienes & Fahey, 1995). On the other hand, similar experiences can be 
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combined and situations can be defined in progressively more abstract ways, until the look-up 
table blends into a more general rule-based model. Overly general rules, such as “start at the 
extremes and work towards the middle,” would lie at the abstract, model-based end of a 
continuum between the two models.  
 It has also been hypothesized that implicit learning of the process control task may not 
be dependent on recalling specific instances, but rather depend on pattern recognition of family 
resemblance among the patterns of responses across trials (Sun & Mathews, 2005). Sun and 
Mathews (2005) believe that the process control task is learned more like a skill (e.g., learning 
to shoot at a moving target), than by explicit rules (e.g., following a recipe). Although there is 
some evidence of learning the process control task by the recall of exemplars, Sun and Mathews 
(2005) believe that while the knowledge may be expressed as a look-up table when asked to 
verbalize one’s acquired knowledge, that it is ultimately more than that. It is believed that the 
mental representation may contain additional information that comes from the implicit 
abstraction of family resemblances among correct responses. This is based on the finding that 
concurrent reflection while performing the task was found to interfere with learning because it 
acts as a secondary task and detracts one from seeing the family resemblances across trials 
(Roussel, 1999).  Other evidence that the process control task is learned and controlled through 
pattern recognition is that even when participants were not given any time to reflect during (i.e., 
they performed a speeded version of the task) or after (i.e., a distracter task was employed) 
practice, giving a simple hint (e.g., three valid examples) was just as effective as when 
participants were allowed to reflect (Sun & Mathews, 2005). If this effect resulted from figuring 
out the rules and filling in a look-up table until all twelve instances were discovered, concurrent 
reflection with the hint should have been very helpful. Each correct response could be written 
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down until all the possible responses were recorded. Instead, the hint was found to be very 
helpful even without the time to reflect. This suggests that participants were not recalling good 
instances and reapplying them to control the task since they would not have had the time to do 
so in the speeded version, but rather that the hints helped participants to learn how to look at the 
pattern of successful and unsuccessful trials while performing the task (Sun & Mathews, 2005). 
In other words, the hints may cause participants to focus more on the trial-by-trial changes in 
the pattern of the output, and that such a change in attention would enhance the implicit 
learning of the task. 
Purpose of the Study 
  Sun and Mathews (2005) suggest that experientially acquired implicit knowledge 
is similar to learning through pattern recognition. During implicit learning, tasks are learned 
passively and without awareness of what was learned. This is akin to recognizing a friend’s 
face, where you are consciously aware and instantly know who the person is, but probably have 
little consciousness and are not aware of what cues or features are being used to recognize that 
person. Pattern recognition while controlling the process control task would be similar to 
playing a computerized ping-pong game, where one responds to where the ball is and moves the 
paddle accordingly without thinking about it.  Individuals do not form rules while learning to 
play computer ping-pong. If the look-up table hypothesis was applied to this, it may postulate 
that one mentally segments the screen into a graph containing both horizontal and vertical lines, 
and forms rules such as “when the ball is at 30 degrees longitude and 80 degrees latitude, turn 
the paddle three quarters of a turn in a counter-clockwise direction”. Surely, most would agree 
that no one learns this task in such a ludicrous way. Similarly, in the process control task 
participants would respond to visual cues and implicitly know what to input based on the graph, 
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and not form rules for specific instances (i.e., a look-up table).  This study will investigate the 
effects of different types of mental representations by manipulating instructions and information 
provided by having participants control the nuclear reactor version of the process control task 
after either memorizing a complete table of all twelve possible instances, receiving hints that 
consist of either three valid instances or a general idea of the relationship between the input and 
output, being explicitly instructed to perform the task by visually examining the input and 
output graphs on the screen, or receiving no instruction on how to perform the task. This study 
will also examine the transfer of implicit pattern recognition by testing participants’ 
performance on a visually similar task (i.e., the scale of the input numbers will be logarithmic), 
and, in addition, also examine the transfer of implicit and explicit knowledge by having 
participants in all groups attempt to maintain a new target level on another transfer test. This 
knowledge will also be assessed by administering a paper and pencil test consisting of visual 
screen shots with the numbers removed, and verbal questions consisting of single input/output 
scenarios.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 This study will address the following specific questions and investigate the 
consequential hypotheses presented below: 
Research Question 1:  Do individuals normally learn to perform the process control task 
through pattern recognition from visual cues or through the employment of a look-up table (i.e., 
recalling and applying specific valid instances)? 
Research Question 2:  How does the mental representation of the knowledge acquired 




Hypothesis 1:  It is believed that without special instruction, participants will learn to 
perform the process control task through visual pattern recognition rather than through the 
recall of exemplars. This will be shown through the utilization of a speeded version of the 
process control task in which participants will not have the time for the recollection of specific 
valid instances, and by giving participants in one condition explicit instructions to control the 
task through visual means.  It is predicted that the visually instructed group and the group that is 
not instructed (i.e., the experiential group), will outperform the group that will memorize the 
look-up table of all possible instances on the speeded version of the process control task, but not 
on a self-paced version of the task. The table memorization group is expected to perform best 
on the self-paced tests since they would easily have enough time to think of and input the 
correct responses that they had already memorized. Performance of the groups receiving the 
hints should come out in the middle of the other groups, with the performance of the group 
receiving the three specific instances falling closer to the table memorization group since the 
hint given to them is a partial table, and the performance of the group being given the general 
hint landing nearer to the experiential and visually instructed groups since the hint given to 
them simply suggests a pattern between the input and output graphs. Furthermore, the visually 
instructed group is expected to have the best performance on the speeded test since they will be 
given a strategy to control the task that is fast (i.e., pattern recognition). 
Hypothesis 2:  It is alleged also, that if the mental representation of the knowledge from 
this task is acquired through pattern recognition, that participants receiving visual instructions 
will show the greatest transfer to a visually similar task with a different scale and on visual 
screen shot questions with the input and output numbers removed on a paper and pencil test, 
and that the experiential control group will show greater transfer than the group memorizing the 
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look-up table on the same tasks, since the new scale will create different  rules that were not 
studied previously. Transfer is also predicted to be the worst for the table memorization group, 
and the best for the visually instructed group, on a transfer test in which participants attempt to 
maintain a new target level, which will also result in new rules governing the task that were not 
studied. Once more, the performance of the groups receiving hints are expected to fall in 
















Participants and Design 
 Participants in this study were undergraduate students enrolled in introductory 
psychology courses at Louisiana State University who voluntarily participated in exchange for 
extra credit.  A total of one hundred thirty four subjects participated in the seven different 
conditions (e.g., five conditions with practice: table memorization, visual instruction, general 
hint, specific hint, experiential practice, and two control conditions without practice:  table 
memorization without practice, and an experiential condition that received no instruction and no 
practice time) in both sessions. Five students who participated in session one did not show up 
for session two, and therefore were not included in any analyses. In addition, some data was lost 
as a result of two computers experiencing hard drive failures; therefore the number of 
participants for each test is slightly different.  
 The experiment was arranged as a factorial design that consisted of the following 
factors: 1.) Type of practice (table memorization, visual practice, general hint, specific hint, and 
experiential practice), and 2.) Type of test (two self-paced tests, a fast-paced test, a paper test, 
and transfer tests for a new target level and a different scale).   
 The principal dependent measure is performance on the tests, as indicated by the 
average unsigned deviation from the target production level during the testing phases of the 
process control task.  Means from the first practice phase (i.e., in session one) were also 
obtained in order to show improvement in the transfer of knowledge with practice. In addition, 





 The primary task utilized for this study was the nuclear reactor version of the process 
control task, as described earlier in the research conducted by Sun and Mathews (2005). The 
nuclear reactor version of this task is exactly the same as the sugar production task used by 
Berry and Broadbent (1984) in all aspects except the cover story and the labels for the input and 
output of the system. It employed the identical formula, specified previously, to determine its 
output. The task is described as a simulated nuclear reactor that participants must control and 
maintain the temperature of by inputting fuel  pellets (see Appendix A). Thus, the input is 
labeled “Fuel Pellets”, and the output is labeled “Reactor Temperature”. The participants’ task 
was to maintain the nuclear reactor’s temperature as closely as possible to the target level. On 
each trial they had to input a new level for the number of fuel pellets, and the nuclear reactor 
output its temperature accordingly. Over the two sessions, each participant completed hundreds 
of trials in two practice phases (one per session, except for the no practice conditions) and 
several testing phases.  
 Several manipulations were done with the nuclear reactor version of the process control 
task to create different tests in this experiment. Besides the standard self-paced test using this 
task, this study also utilized a speeded test in which participants had to input their fuel amounts 
very quickly (i.e., within 1.5 seconds), which was meant to block the explicit recall of 
exemplars, and also a test with a different target level (i.e., 8000 instead of 6000) to test transfer 
of knowledge, and a test in which the input numbers were displayed in their logarithmic values. 
The logarithm scale was used for this test in a way that visual patterns in the graphs would 
remain the same as the standard version of the task, but the intervals between the numerical 
values of the inputs would be radically different, in order to assess visual pattern recognition. 
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 Other tasks used in this experiment include a paper and pencil test which included 
output temperatures given either verbally (see Appendix E) in order to test explicit recall, or in 
a screen shot view of the graphs shown on the screen (see Appendix H) to test pattern 
recognition. For each output, participants were asked to give the best input of fuel pellets in 
order to maintain a 6000 degree temperature in the reactor.  
Procedure 
 Participants were placed randomly in one of the seven conditions: 1.) Table 
memorization with practice, 2.) Visual instruction, 3.) General hint, 4.) Specific hint, 5.) 
Experiential (i.e., no instruction) with practice, 6.) Table memorization without practice, 
transfer test only, and 7.) Experiential without practice, transfer test only. Those assigned to the 
table memorization conditions received a table of all twelve possible instances of the reactor’s 
temperature and the best inputs to reach the target, and instructions to study and memorize the 
table (see Appendix B). Participants in the visual instruction group received instructions to 
perform the task by visual means (see Appendix C). The experiential groups did not receive any 
instruction beyond the description of the task (see Appendix A). Participants in the two hint 
groups received hints about how the task operates. The general hint gives the subject a general 
idea of the pattern between the input and the output of the system (see Appendix F), while the 
specific hint gives the user a partial table consisting of three specific examples of inputs based 
on current output level (see Appendix G).  All participants in the conditions, except for those in 
the no practice control conditions, completed two 1-hour sessions in which they attempted to 
control the nuclear reactor’s temperature in the simulation. The no practice control conditions 
simply took only the transfer test to a new target level (e.g., the table memorization without 
practice and experiential without practice, transfer test only conditions) in a single session. 
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Participants in the table memorization without practice condition memorized the table in the 
same manner as the table memorization with practice condition except that the former group did 
not get time to practice the task and simply took the transfer test for a new target level (i.e., 
participants were asked to maintain the reactor’s temperature at 8000 in the test after 
memorizing the best inputs to maintain a 6000 degree level). The two sessions for the rest of the 
participants were spaced 48 hours apart in order to test for retention of the knowledge gained in 
the first session.  
First Session 
 In the first session, all participants were notified how the simulated nuclear reactor task 
is arranged and performed by being given a general instruction sheet on how to operate the task 
(see Appendix A). This informed them that it is their job to discover how to achieve and 
maintain a target level of temperature by interacting with the simulation. Furthermore, 
participants were told that they were in control of only a single input variable (i.e., the number 
of fuel pellets). Therefore, their task was to learn the relationship between the amount of fuel 
input into the system and the nuclear reactor’s temperature output.  
 At the beginning of session one, subjects in both table memorization groups (i.e., with 
and without practice) were given a table of all possible instances and the correct corresponding 
inputs, and were instructed to study the table for two minutes for a later recall test (see 
Appendix B). After the two-minute study period, participants in both table memorization 
conditions were given the recall test consisting of all the possible outputs of the nuclear reactor 
in two dissimilar orders, which asked for the correct input responses.  Participants had to get all 
twelve input responses correct in both orders before moving on to practicing the reactor task. 
This ensured that they had memorized the table and knew it well.  
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 Participants in the visual instruction group were told that the best approach for learning 
this task is to learn it like a skill (e.g., throwing darts). They were informed that through the trial 
and error of trying many different inputs and watching the input and output graphs, they would 
eventually know the right responses without having to think about it (see Appendix C). 
Participants assigned to either the general or specific hint groups received the general or 
specific hints (Appendices F & G), respectively. The experiential condition simply began 
performing the task immediately after reading its description (Appendix A), and did not receive 
any further instruction.  
 When participants in the five conditions (i.e., not including the control conditions 
without practice) were prepared, they began performing the task with 20 minutes of practice 
time using a self-paced version of the simulated nuclear reactor task. In the self-paced task, 
participants are given as much time as they want (up to the allotted time for this phase) for each 
new trial.  A trial consists of a single attempt at inputting fuel pellets into the system. Ten trials 
are shown on the screen cumulatively (see Appendix D for a screen shot example), with each 
set of ten trials comprising a block. Participants completed as many blocks as they could in this 
20 minute practice phase.  
 After completing the 20 minute practice phase, participants moved on to an un-timed, 
self-paced testing phase, consisting of 50 blocks (i.e., 500 trials). They were allowed the 
remaining time in the one-hour session to complete this test. Participants in the table 
memorization without practice condition simply performed the test for a new target level 
immediately after passing the table recall test. The participants in the experiential condition 
without practice also just took the transfer test to a new target level (experiential without 




The second session first consisted of five minutes of practice time in which subjects 
received their group’s instructions and practiced the self-paced task once more. Following that, 
the instructions were taken away and participants were given another un-timed, self-paced test, 
consisting of 50 blocks in order to evaluate the retention of the knowledge needed to control the 
task from session one. Next, participants were given a fast-paced version of the 50 block test in 
which they had to enter their input for each trial within 1.5 seconds (1500 ms). This was done to 
block any reflection or recalling of exemplars in order to test implicit pattern recognition as 
described previously.  
 Subsequent tests were given in session two to test for transfer to a visually similar, but 
different numerical scale, and to test for transfer to a target level that was not attempted by the 
participants up to that time. The transfer test to a new target level was administered first, which 
used the pre-existing scale for inputs and outputs with only the target level changed to 8000, 
and like the other tests, was also 50 blocks and not timed. Next, the transfer test utilizing the 
different scale was given in order to further examine pattern recognition. This test used 
logarithms of the existing scale for inputs, so that the ratio of the resulting scale was visually 
the same, but the numeric intervals for the inputs were quite dissimilar. The target level 
remained in the middle of the scale at 6000. This test was also un-timed and consisted of 50 
blocks as well.  
In addition, for session two, a paper and pencil test using the original target level of 
6000, and consisting of two types of questions, was administered to participants. This was given 
directly after the speeded test since the transfer tests may cause subjects to learn new rules (i.e., 
novel inputs are required for a different target level). The first type of questions included on the 
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paper test was verbal questions which present the participant with only a single temperature 
output, and asks for the corresponding input level to use in that specific instance (see Appendix 
E). This part of the test consisted of half of the 12 possible temperature outputs arranged in a 
random order. The second type of question that was utilized on the paper test was screen shot 
examples of the input and output graphs. These questions displayed what the participants saw 
on the screen while performing the task, except that the input and output numbers were 
removed to test for “pure” pattern recognition (see Appendix H). The screen shot examples part 
of the paper test included the six specific output temperatures that were not tested with the 
verbal questions. 
  At the conclusion of session two for all but the no practice control conditions, 
participants were debriefed and given a paper slip worth the extra credit points for their classes 
for participating in both sessions of the experiment. Participants in the control conditions 













Results and Discussion 
Summary of Overall Performance  
Figure 1 displays the overall performance of the five practice conditions across all the 
tests performed on the computer and the first five blocks of practice during session one. 
Improvement with practice is apparent in all conditions, even those who had memorized the 
table of the best input responses. Clearly, performance improves with practice, allowing 






                 
Figure1  
 Overall Performance across First Five Blocks of Practice and Standard and Transfer  
 Tests in Both Sessions by Condition 
 Note: Performance is measured by mean deviation from the target level for each test.  
 No significant differences were found between the two standard tests in session one and 
session two (i.e., Test 1 and Test 2 in Figure 1). This demonstrates that participants retained 































the test in session two. In addition, some improvement was shown in the experiential-based 
practice conditions across sessions, demonstrating greater retention of implicit task knowledge, 
whereas the explicit conditions (i.e., the table memorization and specific hint groups) actually 
had worse performance in session two’s standard test. 
The table memorization group’s unexpected superior performance on the speeded test 
may have been due to the amount of time allotted for each input on the speeded test (i.e., 1.5 
seconds). This may not have fully blocked the explicit recall of exemplars as it was intended to 
do, but the table memorization practice condition’s greater impairment on the speeded test 
demonstrates that explicit knowledge can not be used well at this fast pace. The participants in 
the table memorization condition that took this test were also allowed practice time with the 
task prior to this test, so they may have gained experiential knowledge of the task as well as 
being able to recall the exemplars from the memorized table.  
The results from the transfer tests show that practice is necessary to learn to control the 
process control task well. Simply memorizing exemplars did not lead to transfer to another 
target level. These results suggest that explicit knowledge is less transferable than the implicit 
knowledge acquired through practice in this task. This is shown by the performance of the table 
memorization with practice group, who performed no better than the experiential with practice 
group. In addition, all the practice conditions performed similarly, and the conditions that did 
not practice (i.e., either after having memorized the table or not) performed equally well, 
indicating that no explicit knowledge was transferred to this new task.  
Although the table memorization group did perform better on the logarithm scale 
transfer test, it could have been due to the participants acquiring additional experiential 
knowledge during practice or the flawed nature of the task not fully blocking the application of 
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explicit knowledge during this self-paced test. In addition, the general hint’s effect, and not the 
specific hint’s on this test, may have been due to the relationship of the inputs and outputs 
following a similar pattern to the standard test, and hence the general hint would still be 
applicable, whereas the specific hint and the table could not be directly applied to the 
logarithmic values (i.e., the specific hint and the table could be indirectly applied through 
interpellation).  
The results obtained from all the tests will be discussed in further detail using separate 
ANOVAs to analyze the data from each test individually. In addition, the number of trials 
attempted by each group during the practice phases will also be discussed.  
Practice Phases 
 Analyses were done on the practice phases in both sessions one and two (e.g., 20 
minutes of practice in session one, and 5 minutes of practice in session two) to determine 
whether there were differences between practice conditions in the number of trials attempted. It 
would seem, that since the table memorization condition had the correct inputs memorized, that 
the participants in that condition would perform more trials during the practice phases, since 
they would simply be inputting numbers without much thought. However, analyses done on the 
number of practice trials performed in the allotted time only revealed a significant difference in 
session two (i.e., the 5 minute practice phase), F(4, 104) = 3.54, p = .01, with the table 
memorization condition and the experiential condition performing significantly more trials than 
the general hint group only.  The mean number of practice trials, measured in blocks (e.g., each 
block equals ten trials), for each condition, along with their corresponding standard deviations, 
is given in Table 1.  
 The poor performance means from the first 5 blocks of practice in session one, shown in 




Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Number of Blocks  
Performed in Each Session During Practice Phases 
        
   __________Session__________ 
Condition______________1_______________2_______________n_ 
General Hint  51.33 (17.69)       17.29 (3.04)  24 
Specific Hint   52.64 (15.54)       20.38 (6.57)  21 
Visual Instruction 53.05 (17.10)       20.48 (6.52)  21 
Experiential  56.52 (11.90)       22.29 (6.40)  21 
Table Memorization 58.73 (15.08)       23.14 (5.68)  22 
________________________________________________________ 
the practice data from the first 5 blocks indicated a significant effect of condition, F(4, 108) = 
17.07, p < .001, with the group that memorized the table of best responses performing the best 
right away, as was expected. However, the group that had memorized the table still performed 
much more poorly during these first 5 blocks relative to their later performance, indicating that 
they had learned more than just the table during practice. Experiential knowledge was 
obviously gained through practice in all the conditions that included practice time (e.g., 
compare the means of the first 5 blocks of practice and performance on the first test in session 
one for the five practice conditions). This demonstrates that practice does lead to better 
performance of this task, even when not given any specific instructions, since the experiential 
with practice condition’s performance also significantly improved.  
Session 1 – Session 2 
 A repeated-measures ANOVA was done on the equivalent self-paced tests in session 




Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level (6000)  
on First Five Blocks of Practice in Session One by Condition 
     
Condition_____________First 5 Blocks of Practice_______n__  
General Hint   3262.50 (681.87)  24 
Specific Hint    3001.09 (956.82)  21 
Visual Instruction  3377.14 (467.39)  21 
Experiential   3315.83 (416.69)  21 
Table Memorization  1882.73 (890.81)  22 
___________________________________________________ 
nuclear reactor’s temperature in the first test in session two. The main purpose of this analysis 
was to examine the participants’ knowledge that was acquired from the different practice 
conditions. Another purpose of this analysis was to examine the retention of the participants’ 
knowledge that was acquired from session one until session two, which was 48 hours later. This 
analysis included session (i.e., the self-paced tests from session one and two) as the within-
subjects factor, and condition (identified by type of practice) as the between-subjects variable. 
The average unsigned deviation from the target production level, which was 6000 in these tests, 
is given for each condition along with its corresponding standard deviation, in Table 3. Results 
from the ANOVA revealed no significant differences in performance across sessions on the 
self-paced tests, F(1, 102) = 1.97, ns, indicating that participants did not significantly improve 
their performance in session two. However, some improvement was shown in the practice 
conditions that were thought to rely on memory-based performance (i.e., the visual, 
experiential, and general hint conditions), demonstrating some retention of implicit task 
knowledge. Although improvement across sessions was not significant, this analysis did show a 
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main effect of condition, F(4, 102) = 22.04, p < .001, with the table memorization group 
demonstrating the best performance as was predicted for these tests.  
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level (6000)  
on Self-Paced Tests as a Function of Condition and Session 
         
          __________Session__________ 
Condition______________________1__________________2___________n__  
General Hint   2363.67 (809.61) 2087.67 (899.72) 24 
Specific Hint    2057.40 (845.21) 2197.60 (859.46) 20 
Visual Instruction  2892.67 (745.44) 2789.71 (780.71) 21 
Experiential   2453.70 (818.71) 2132.50 (886.99) 20 
Table Memorization    959.82 (254.09) 1023.73 (500.94) 22 
________________________________________________________________ 
 Post hoc tests of comparisons confirmed that participants in the table memorization 
group performed significantly better than those in all of the other conditions. In addition, 
significant differences between the visual instruction condition and all the other groups, except 
the experiential group, were found. However, the performance of the visually instructed group 
was inferior to the performance of participants in the other conditions, which was not expected 
since the visual instructions were thought to help. Although the visual instructions do not 
appear to facilitate performance, they apparently do not significantly impair it since the 
difference in performance between the visually instructed group and the experiential group, 
which received no instruction, was not significant. There were no other significant effects or 
interactions found in this analysis.  
 
35 
Test 2 – Speed Test 
 The next analysis that was done examined differences in performance between the self-
paced test and the speeded test in session two, since these two tests were completed sequentially 
and were the same except for the time restriction (1500 ms) in the speeded test. A repeated-
measures ANOVA was computed with test (self-paced vs. speeded) as the within-subjects 
factor and practice condition as the between-subjects factor. This allowed not only differences 
between the groups on each test to be examined, but differences within each group between 
each of the tests to be looked at as well. Mean deviations from the target level, which was also 
6000 in both of these tests, along with standard deviations, are given for each condition in  
Table 4.  
Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level (6000)  
on Self-Paced Test and Speeded Test (1500 ms) in Session Two by Condition 
  
          __________Test__________ 
Condition__________________Self-Paced___________Speeded________n__  
General Hint   2087.67 (899.72) 2520.75 (619.40) 24 
Specific Hint    2162.53 (868.18) 2352.84 (627.32) 19 
Visual Instruction  2789.71 (780.71) 2950.38 (592.34) 21 
Experiential   2167.52 (879.36) 2524.29 (876.90) 21 
Table Memorization  1023.73 (500.94) 2022.27 (727.95) 22 
_______________________________________________________________ 
The analysis of within-subjects contrasts revealed significant differences between the 
tests, F(1, 102) = 41.82, p < .001, and a test by group interaction, F(4, 102) = 5.28, p = .001, 
with performance being poorer on the speeded test in all conditions, as expected. However, 
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participants in the table memorization practice condition were hypothesized to do the worst on 
the speeded test, which is clearly not the case. The between-subjects examination by condition 
showed significant differences between the conditions, F(4, 102) = 11.22, p < .001, with the 
table memorization group performing the best on both tests.  
 While the time allotted for each input on the speeded test may not have fully blocked 
explicit recall of exemplars, the table memorization practice condition’s greater impairment on 
the speeded test demonstrates that explicit knowledge can not be used well at this fast pace. The 
table memorization group’s performance on the speeded test did show the most impairment out 
of all the practice conditions, with the mean deviation from the target almost doubling on the 
speeded test as compared to the self-paced test that immediately preceded it (e.g., 1023.73 on 
the self-paced test in session two vs. 2022.27 on the speeded test).  
 Post hoc tests verified that the table memorization group performed significantly better 
on both tests than all the other practice conditions.  This was not anticipated since it was 
thought that the participants in the table memorization practice condition would not have 
sufficient time to recall the exemplars that they had memorized previously while performing the 
speeded test. Furthermore, participants’ performance in the visual instruction condition, which 
was expected to be superior, was found to be significantly worse than both the hint groups, but 
not the experiential group. Again, this shows that although they did not help as expected, the 
visual instructions did not hurt performance significantly.  
 Transfer Tests 
New Target Level Test  
 Performance on the transfer test to a new target level was analyzed with a one-way 
ANOVA by condition in order to demonstrate transfer of any knowledge previously learned and 
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differences in the amount of generalizable knowledge learned by each group. The mean 
deviation from the target level, which was 8000 for this test, is given for each condition along 
with its corresponding standard deviation, in Table 5. Results from this analysis displayed a 
main effect of condition, F(6, 159) = 6.77, p < .001. Post hoc tests revealed that the experiential 
without practice condition performed significantly worse than all the other conditions except for 
the table memorization without practice condition, which performed significantly worse than 
the remaining conditions except for the visually instructed group. The table memorization and 
experiential with practice  
Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level (8000)  
on New Target Level Test by Condition 
      
Condition_________________________New Target Level Test_________n__  
General Hint     2198.94 (991.53)  24 
Specific Hint      2238.61 (937.39)  21 
Visual Instruction    2573.79 (955.73)  21 
Experiential with Practice   2074.64 (774.53)  23 
Experiential without Practice   3191.07 (931.81)  30 
Table Memorization with Practice  2155.27 (705.53)  22 
Table Memorization without Practice 2850.45 (835.92)  25 
________________________________________________________________ 
conditions performed significantly better than the two corresponding conditions without 
practice and the visually instructed group.  
It was expected that participants who practiced the task and were instructed to use visual 
means to control the task, those that were not instructed (i.e., the experiential group), and, to a 
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smaller degree, participants that received the general hint about how the task operates, would 
show greater transfer of generalizable knowledge than participants in practice conditions that 
were thought to induce model-based learning (i.e., the table memorization group, and to a lesser 
extent, the specific hint group). One reason for the lack of finding significant differences 
between the groups that practiced the task in this analysis could have been because all of the 
participants in the five conditions that practiced the task completed an equivalent amount of 
practice time (i.e., 20 minutes in session one, and 5 minutes in session two) in which they could 
also acquire implicit task knowledge in addition to any explicit knowledge they were given or 
had learned, regardless of which practice condition they were in (i.e., the participants in the 
table memorization with practice condition would gain the same amount of experiential task 
knowledge as the other practice conditions). This is why the two control conditions that were 
not allowed any practice time (i.e., the table memorization without practice and experiential 
without practice conditions), and therefore not exposed to the task prior to the test, were also 
included. This finding suggests that a similar amount of generalizable knowledge was learned 
by all participants who practiced the task, regardless of which practice condition they were in. 
The results from this test show that practice is necessary to learn to control the system 
well, and that simply memorizing exemplars for one target level does not lead to transfer to 
another target level. These results also suggest that explicit knowledge is less transferable than 
the implicit knowledge acquired in the process control task. This can be demonstrated by the 
performance of the table memorization with practice group, who had acquired the greatest 
amount of explicit task knowledge and performed no better than the experiential with practice 
group, who had obtained mostly implicit knowledge of the task during practice. Since all the 
practice conditions performed similarly, and the conditions that did not practice performed so 
poorly, this indicates that no explicit knowledge was transferred to this new task.  
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Logarithm Test  
A one-way ANOVA by practice condition was performed on the logarithm test to 
further assess pattern recognition in the participants. The target level for this test was 6000, 
making it visually comparable to the self-paced tests in all aspects except for the logarithmic 
input values. The ANOVA displayed a significant effect of practice condition, F(4, 101) = 2.64, 
p < .05, with the table memorization group performing considerably better than participants in 
the visual instruction condition. The means and standard deviations for each condition’s test 
performance are presented in Table 6.  
A post hoc test of comparisons revealed that the table memorization group’s 
performance was significantly improved over the performance of participants in the visually 
instructed group. No other significant differences between groups were found. This result was 
the opposite of the outcome that was predicted since it was thought that participants would have 
to rely on visual pattern recognition to perform this test. A possible reason for this is because 
the logarithmic values of the inputs were displayed on the screen in descending order in the 
identical manner of the inputs on the other tests. Since this was a self-paced test, sufficient time 
was available to permit participants to simply count which of the twelve “levels” each of the 
logarithmic inputs was displayed at, and thus mentally translate them back into their pre-
logarithmic values (e.g., if the current output was 9000, the participant could count the 
logarithmic inputs and choose the seventh one from the bottom which represents 700, the 
correct input response). Assuming that this is what participants did for this test, and that this test 
was not completely successful in blocking the use of explicit knowledge, the table would be 




Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Deviation from Target Level  
on Logarithm Test by Condition 
      
Condition_________________Logarithm Test___________n__  
General Hint   2137.83 (727.99)  23 
Specific Hint    2443.18 (886.13)  17 
Visual Instruction  2719.16 (692.32)  19 
Experiential   2379.90 (926.20)  21 
Table Memorization  1948.34 (859.59)  22 
____________________________________________________ 
Paper Test 
Screen Shot Scenarios  
This part of the paper test investigated the transfer of implicit knowledge of patterns by 
utilizing screen shot examples of six of the twelve possible output temperatures with the input 
and output numbers removed (see Appendix H). This was done so that participants would have 
to rely purely on pattern recognition to answer the questions. It was hypothesized that the 
visually instructed group and the experiential group’s performance would be superior on this 
portion of the paper test. However, results from post hoc tests show that participants in the table 
memorization practice condition performed significantly better than all other groups on these 
questions, and therefore a significant difference between groups was found, F(4, 98) = 23.66, p 
< .001. This is possibly because of the participants’ experiential knowledge that was gained 
during practice, or possibly because knowledge of the table could have been applied since 
participants could have counted the lines on the edges of the graphs to figure out what 
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numerical values they represented. Means and standard deviations for this part of the paper test 
are displayed in Table 7 along with the means and standard deviations for the verbal portion of 
the test.  
Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) for Paper Test in  
Session Two by Condition and Type of Question 
         
  __________Type of Question__________ 
Condition_________________Verbal_____Screen Shot___n__  
General Hint   1.82 (2.04) 1.59 (1.26) 22 
Specific Hint    2.63 (1.92) 1.95 (1.78) 19 
Visual Instruction  0.81 (1.25) 1.14 (1.10) 21 
Experiential   2.00 (1.80) 1.55 (1.26) 22 
Table Memorization  5.71 (0.72) 4.71 (1.38) 21 
___________________________________________________ 
Note: Scores are out of 6 possible correct answers. 
Verbal Questions  
 Single output scenarios that asked for the corresponding input values were used for this 
section of the paper test in order to examine participants’ model-based knowledge to see 
whether they had learned specific rules on how to control the reactor (i.e., “If current reactor 
temperature is 10,000, then input 800 fuel pellets; If current reactor temperature is 11,000, then 
input 700 fuel pellets, etc.”). Analysis on the verbal part of the paper test revealed a significant 
effect of practice condition, F(4, 98) = 25.59, p < .001, with participants in the group that 
memorized the table performing the best, as expected.   
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Post hoc tests verified that the table memorization group did significantly better, 
recalling more exemplars than participants in all other practice conditions. Furthermore, 
participants in the visually instructed group performed significantly worse than all other 
practice conditions. This finding was anticipated since it was hypothesized that visually 
instructed participants would have the least amount of explicit knowledge, and the participants 
that had memorized the table of correct responses would have had the greatest amount. This 
result also supports the hypothesis that generating a table is not what usually occurs when 
people learn this task since the table memorization group had more knowledge of the correct 
input/output pairs than the experiential group. Means and standard deviations for the paper test 














While the results from this study do not appear to lend support to the first hypothesis 
proposed here- that the process control task is normally learned through visual recognition of 
patterns of inputs and outputs across trials- the results neither support that the task is normally 
learned by the storage of exemplars in the form of a look-up table. Although it was predicted 
that participants in the visually instructed practice condition would perform the best on the 
speeded test and the transfer tests, the visual instruction group performed the worst on all the 
tests. The unexpected poor performance of the visually instructed group may have been due to 
the passive nature of the instructions (i.e., telling participants to just watch the graphs and 
perform by trial and error). This result sheds new light on what is needed to learn the process 
control task. Clearly, just watching the results of trial and error responses while performing the 
task is inadequate. Other research (Roussel, 1999; Sun & Mathews, 2005) has shown that 
careful internal reflection while performing the task is not beneficial either. There seems to be 
something in between, perhaps just reinforcement learning. This would involve simply being 
engaged with the task (i.e., actively trying to control the nuclear reactor’s temperature) and 
evaluating responses that work best with respect to the goal.  
It does not appear that heuristic strategies (Fum & Stocco, 2003) are necessary either, 
because participants in the table memorization practice condition would not have needed to 
actively employ any strategies while performing the process control task. Yet this group 
appeared to acquire the same level of implicit experiential knowledge as the other practice 
conditions, as evidenced by their performance on the transfer tests.  
The table memorization group performed much better on the standard tests than the 
experiential or hint groups, which suggests that natural learning of this task is different. 
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Acquiring good implicit knowledge of the task through active practice seems to be the key to 
flexible knowledge, rather than learning the best responses, as evidenced by the no practice 
control condition’s poor performance on the new target test. The table memorization practice 
condition also demonstrated the greatest impairment on the speeded version of the task, further 
advocating that this may not be the best way to learn flexible knowledge. 
Although they showed the most impairment, the unsurpassed performance of 
participants in the table memorization practice condition on the speeded test could be explained 
by the possibility that the rate of entry (1.5 seconds) may have been too slow to completely 
block model-based use (i.e., the retrieval of exemplars). If this were the case, the speeded test 
would have been only partially successful in eliminating the use of their explicit knowledge. 
Sufficient time during the speeded test would only be needed to recall the previously 
memorized instances, not for learners to discover rules and build mental models. The amount of 
time allotted to participants for each input response in this test (1.5 seconds) was probably 
enough to easily recall and input one correct value on most of the trials. However, all groups 
did show considerable impairment on the speeded test, so, obviously, the speeded test was fast 
enough for participants not to be able to use their explicit task knowledge well.  
The facilitative effects of experimenter-provided task hints can also be seen in this 
study, with the groups receiving either the general or specific hints performing significantly 
better than the visual and experiential groups on the standard tests. The group that memorized 
the table, which can be considered an ‘all-inclusive hint’, and also practiced the task, performed 
the best out of all of the groups on all of the tests using the process control task, except for the 
transfer test to a new target level. Although the speeded test may have only been a partially 
successful attempt to stop the use of a look-up table, the new target transfer test did apparently 
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remove all value of the look-up table, reducing the performance in the table memorization 
practice condition to the same level as the other groups that also were allowed to practice the 
task prior to the test. The performance of the table memorization without practice condition’s 
performance on this test was even worse than the visually instructed group’s performance. This 
suggests that participants in all of the practice conditions acquired a comparable amount of 
implicit experiential knowledge, and that any explicit knowledge acquired by the participants 
was not transferred. This is consistent with prior research that demonstrated that the hints’ 
efficacy is due more to facilitating memory-based processes rather than serving as a cue to build 
a mental model of the task (Sun & Mathews, 2005). 
Hypothesis two posited that participants in the more memory-based practice conditions 
would demonstrate the greatest transfer of knowledge to other perceptually similar tasks (i.e., 
the transfer tasks), however, this was not what was found. Although all of the practice 
conditions were found to acquire a similar amount of generalizable knowledge in the transfer 
test to a new target level, this was possibly because all of the groups completed an equivalent 
amount of practice time in which they could acquire implicit task knowledge, regardless of 
what type of explicit instruction they were given. Given that memorizing and using the table for 
one target level should not help transfer to a new target level because the table values would be 
wrong, participants in the table memorization condition were apparently learning more than just 
the table by developing good implicit knowledge of the task as well. Further support for 
acquiring experiential task knowledge through practice regardless of instruction is found in the 
results of the control conditions in which participants either memorized the table or received no 
instruction, but were not allowed to practice the task. The performance in these conditions was 
considerably worse than all the other conditions that were allowed to practice the task, 
 
46 
suggesting that participants were developing good implicit knowledge of the task through 
practice.  
The logarithm test also examined the transfer of implicit pattern recognition in the 
process control task; however, the table memorization group unexpectedly outperformed the 
visually instructed group on this task. Again, the possibility that the participants memorizing the 
table also learned additional implicit task knowledge during practice phases could be 
considered a reason for this outcome. Another possibility is that the explicit knowledge of the 
participants in the table memorization group was flexible and did transfer to this task.  
Further evidence for the transfer of explicit table knowledge is found in the table 
group’s performance on the paper test. The results from the verbal portion of the paper test 
document that participants in the table memorization practice condition did acquire the most 
explicit knowledge of the correct pair-wise associations used to control the task. This lends 
further support to the hypothesis that generating and using a table is not what usually occurs 
when people learn this type of task since the experiential group, who were not instructed, did 
not demonstrate such knowledge. Although it was predicted that participants that had 
memorized the table would show the greatest amount of explicit knowledge on the verbal 
questions on the paper test, the table group also unexpectedly did well on the screen-shot 
questions on the paper test, which were meant to assess pattern recognition. These results 
demonstrate the flexibility of learned explicit knowledge of the process control task.  
Although many of the findings from this study were not what were anticipated, the 
results do suggest that both implicit, memory-based knowledge, and explicit, model-based 
knowledge play a role in learning the process control task, and possibly other implicit learning 
tasks. The process control task is not a ‘pure’ task. Since there are no purely implicitly learned 
 
47 
tasks, developing expertise would always depend on both types of knowledge in nearly all 
learning situations. The data suggest that explicit table knowledge of the process control task 
seems to be flexible as well as implicit experiential knowledge acquired through practice. 
However, the results obtained from this study do suggest that the transfer of experiential-based 
knowledge is greater than explicit model-based knowledge in this task. Further research to 
definitely conclude what the precise nature of the mental representation acquired in the process 
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Simulated Nuclear Reactor Control Instructions 
 
 In this study, we are examining artificial nuclear reaction control. We have written a 
program that imitates the response patterns of a nuclear reactor. We are studying the reactor’s 
responses to fuel input. You will play a computer game in which you attempt to control the 
reactor’s pressure by giving it fuel. The reactor’s pressure is represented by numerical scale 
ranging from 1000-12000. We have found that the nuclear reactor is most efficient when it is 
directly in the middle of the pressure scale, at a level of 6000.  
The nuclear reactor will take the number you input (amount of fuel), and will give you an 
output number (nuclear pressure). You will use the numbers 100-1200 and the reactor will 
output the numbers 1000-12000. The goal of the game is to keep the reactor’s pressure at 6000, 
which is the medium pressure level. 
 There are two graphs on the screen. On each graph, the horizontal axis indicates for 
which trial you have just given fuel. The graph on the left represents how much fuel you have 
put into the reactor.  The graph on the right indicates the reactor’s pressure for each trial. By 
looking at the vertical axis on the left hand graph, you can see the amount of fuel you inputted 
for trial number 1; and then you can look at the right hand graph and see what the reactor’s 
change in pressure was for trial number 1. There is a horizontal line drawn at the 6000 point on 
the right hand graph. This is to remind you where the middle pressure level is and to keep the 
reactor’s pressure at this level.  
 Each block of the game consists of ten trials. That is, you will have ten opportunities to 
input fuel. At the end of each block, click ‘OK’ on the screen that pops up to begin the next 
block.  You will do 20 minutes of practice and then you will be tested for 50 blocks on keeping 
the reactor’s pressure at 6000.   
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Appendix B  
Instructions for Table Memorization Group 
You were given a table of correct input responses for every possible output temperature of the 
nuclear reactor (below). You will have 2 minutes to study and memorize it, and then you will be 
tested to be sure you know it well. After that you will use your knowledge of the table to 
control the simulated nuclear reactor in the game.  
The following is a table of the exact behavior of the nuclear reactor. Following this will keep 
the temperature near 6000: 
 
 

















Visual Learning Instructions 
The best way to learn to control the output in this task is by doing lots of trials and watching 
what happens. It’s a lot like learning a skill such as dart throwing. Just keep your eyes on the 
graph and see what happens as you change input values. Watch the resulting changes in the 
output graph. After lots of trials you will eventually become good at keeping the output near 










































Verbal Input/Output Questions for Paper Test 
 
If the current output is 12,000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? _________ 
 
If the current output is 4000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? __________ 
 
If the current output is 10,000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? _________ 
 
If the current output is 8000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? __________ 
 
If the current output is 2000, what number of fuel pellets should be entered? __________ 
 













General Hint Group Instructions 
The number of fuel pellets should always follow the temperature of the reactor. That is, when 
the temperature is high, you need a lot of fuel, and when temperature is low you need little fuel. 
Similarly, when the temperature is near the middle, you should use a moderate amount of fuel, 
























Specific Hint Group Instructions 
Examples of good rules:  
If reactor’s temperature is 1000, then input 300. 
If reactor’s temperature is 4000, then input 500. 
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